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1. Among recent contributions to the problem of 
interpreting modality is The Nature of Necessity, 
which presents Alvin Plantinga's most comprehensive 
attempt to develop a unified treatment of necessity. 
The work is organized around the problem of providing 
an interpretation of de re necessity, the sort of 
modality involved in 
Aristotle is essentially rational, 
in terms of de dicto necessity, necessity conceived as 
a property of propositions or sentences. The heart of 
Plantinga's theory is his scheme for the reduction of 
de re modal sentences to equivalent de dicto ones. The 
idea is to provide an equivalent sentence containing no 
modal operators within the scope of a quantifier for 
every sentence asserting that some thing is necessarily 
or essentially thus and so. Central to the scheme are 
what Plantinga calls kernel propositions, defined by 
Dl) Where x is an object and P a 
property, the kernel proposition 
with respect to x and P, symbolized 
by 'K(x,P)*, is the proposition 
expressed by the result of replacing 
'x' and 'P' in 'x has the complement 
of P* by proper names of x and P. 
The kernel proposition with respect to an object 
properly named by "Bill," for instance, and the 
property baptized with "humanity" is the proposition 
expressed by "Bill has the complement of humanity." 
The function of kernel propositions in Plantinga's 
theory is given by the definition 
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D2) x has P essentially if and only if x 
has P and K(x,P) is necessarily 
false (p. 30). 
Dl and D2 constitute the core of Plantinga's theory; 
together they provide a reduction of de re modal 
claims, such as 
1) Socrates is essentially web-footed, 
to de dicto propositions. For example, according to 
D2, (1) is true just in case Socrates is web-footed and 
K(Socrates, web-footedness) is necessarily false. Now 
K(Socrates, web-footedness) is, by Dl, the proposition 
expressed by the result of replacing "x" by a proper 
name of Socrates and "P" by a proper name of the 
property of having feet like a frog's, in the sentence 
"x has the complement of P." On the not unlikely 
assumption that "Socrates" is, indeed, a proper name of 
Socrates, and similarly for "web-footedness" and the 
property of having webbed feet, K(Socrates, web-
footedness) would be expressed by 
2) Socrates has the complement of web-footedness. 
So (1) is true just in case Socrates has webbed feet 
and (2) is necessarily false. 
The necessary falsity of (2) is to be understood, 
as remarked earlier, as a typical de dicto assertion. 
In keeping with current fasETon, the de dicto 
modalities are understood here in terms of Kripke's 
metaphorically useful modal figures, preserving the 
thrust but easing the rigor of possible-world semantics 
for modal logic. On this account, the necessary 
falsity of (2) is equivalent to the falsity of 
3) Socrates has the complement of web-footedness 
in every possible world. So an essentialist assertion 
to the effect that some object x has a property P 
essentially is true just in case x has P and the 
proposition attributing the complement of P to x is 
false in every possible world. 
Since on most accounts of quantified modal logic an 
object lacks the complement of a property in every 
possible world if and only if it has that property in 
every possible world, Plantinga's formulation of D2 in 
terms of the necessary falsity of the proposition that 
x has the complement of P seems an unnecessary 
132 
impediment to easy assimilation of his basic idea. But 
a simpler formulation of D2 along these lines would not 
do: Plantinga considers logical modifications of 
properties—complements of properties, disjunctions of 
properties, etc.—as properties in their own right, and 
he further requires that the extension of a property at 
a world "w" must be a subset of the set of things 
existing at w (here denoted by "D " ) . So if x is not 
in D , both "x has P" and "x has the complement of P" 
are false in w, for the w-extension of the complement 
of P, as well as that of P itself, is a subset of D to 
which x does not belong. 
Do Plantinga's Dl and D2 accomplish their purpose? 
If the intent is merely to explain essentialism to 
those who claim to comprehend the de dicto but confess 
to confusion when confronted with the de re, then only 
a poll can answer this question. If, however, the 
merits of Dl and D2 are to be assessed relative to the 
espoused aim of providing a reduction of the de re to 
the de dicto, then according to Plantinga himseTT, the 
achievement falls somewhat short of its goal. 
Crucially involved in the reduction of essentialist 
assertions is the use of proper names and, according to 
the major thesis of Plantinga's doctrine of essences, 
proper names express essences. Since the notion of 
essence is "essentialist in excelsis, " the 
transmogrification of linguistic entities achieved by 
Dl and D2 is no reduction of the de re to the de dicto 
it succeeds only insofar as it tacitly involves 
recourse to proper names conceived of in 
characteristically essentialist terms. 
It strikes one as rather odd that Plantinga should 
hail his cleverly contrived scheme as constitutive of a 
reduction of the de re to the de dicto and then turn 
around and repudiate it for its circularity. But 
perhaps his contentions may be understood in the 
following way. Dl and D2 suffice to reduce the de re 
to the de dicto in the sense that any sentence 
containing a modal operator in the scope of a 
quantifier may be eliminated in favor of one that does 
not. So the reduction concerns the elimination of 
claims expressed in a quantified modal language in 
favor of sentences belonging to a restricted sub-
language. The reduction succeeds provided that the 
sub-language in question includes proper names. If, 
however, the thesis of Chapter V of The Nature of 
Necessity is correct, then adequate explication of 
proper names is possible only by means of essences, and 
the reduction holds only for sub-languages whose 
semantics involve essences. Since inclusion of 
133 
essences among the entities employed in the semantical 
interpretation of a language is sufficient to show the 
language is essentialist, it follows that the reduction 
is circular. 
If this construal of Plantinga's argument is 
accurate, then his contentions involve three claims: 
I) If the de re sentences of a language 
L are elTminable, the vocabulary of 
L includes proper names. 
II) Essences are required for the 
semantical explication of proper 
names. 
III) If a language is semantically 
explicable only by means of 
essences, it is essentialist. 
Although (I) seems innocuous and Plantinga apparently 
thinks it is substantiated by the important role played 
by proper names in Dl, it is not true in general. 
Indeed, I will argue that a simple reformulation of Dl, 
which omits any reference to proper names, serves all 
the purposes Dl is designed to fulfill. In support of 
(II) Plantinga advances arguments which support the 
thesis that proper names express essences. After 
arguing that Plantinga's arguments fail to support 
(II), I will try to show that, as far as the purposes 
of Dl are concerned, proper names need not be thought 
to express essences at all. These considerations 
support the rejection of Plantinga's arguments for the 
claim that the reduction provided by Dl and D2 is 
ultimately circular. But first it is important to 
consider Plantinga's characterization of essences and 
his arguments for (II). 
2. According to Plantinga, 
D3) E is an essence if and only if there 
is a world w in which there exists 
an object x that (a) has E 
essentially, and (b) is such that 
there is no world w' in which there 
exists an object distinct from x 
that has E. (p. 72) 
So an essence is an essential property that is uniquely 
possessed by the individual that has it. If Socrateity 
is an essence possessed by Socrates, then in every 
possible world in which it is instantiated, it is 
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instantiated by the individual Socrates and no other. 
Moreover, since Socrateity is an essence of Socrates, 
it entails each of Socrates' essential properties; that 
is, for any property P essential to Socrates, 
Socrateity entails P in the sense that no individual 
instantiating Socrateity lacks P. Thus an essence E is 
an essential propery, unique to the individual 
instantiating it, which entails all the essential 
properties of that individual. 
Here properties are to be understood as semantical 
entities, the sorts of things expressed by predicates. 
For the purposes of this discussion, properties may be 
identified with functions from possible worlds to sets 
of individual objects. The property expressed by "is 
red," for example, is that function the value of which 
at a given world w is the set of red things in w. 
Essences are a species of property and may be conceived 
along the same general lines. Explicitly, essences are 
a certain subset of the functions identified with 
properties. And like properties generally, essences 
may be expresssed by proper names as well as 
predicates; in particular, an essence is expressed by a 
proper name just in case the individual thus named 
instantiates the expressed essence. Essences, then, 
are uniquely instantiated essential properties. Just 
as properties may be expressed by different predicates 
in different worlds, so the same essence may be 
associated with distinct proper names at varying 
reference points. If Socrates is called "Xenophon" in 
v/, he there instantiates Xenophoneity, the very same 
essence expressed by Socrates" in @, tTie actual world. 
The essence expressed by "Socrates" in @ is expressed 
by "Xenophon" in w; both are instantiated by the 
individual named "Socrates" here and "Xenophon" there. 
Plantinga's argument for the claim (II), that 
proper names express essences, has a very simple 
structure. Basically, it involves the establishment of 
two theses: 
A) Proper names express properties. 
B) Some of the properties expressed by 
proper names are uniquely 
instantiated essential properties, 
e.g., essences. 
Obviously, it is just a hop, skip, and a jump from A to 
B. Accordingly, most of our attention will be directed 
towards arguments for the first claim, A. Here 1 will 
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try to show, first of all, that Plantinga's arguments 
for A are fallacious. 
Plantinga's first step in his argument for A is to 
spell out what it means for a property to be expressed 
by a singular term. 
D) A singular term t expresses a 
property P if and only if any result 
of replacing 'x' and 'P' in 'x has 
the complement of P* by t and a 
proper name of P expresses a 
necessarily false proposition. (p. 
78) 
It is worth noting how well D captures our intuitions 
when the singular term in question is a descriptive 
phrase, for instance, "The first American to climb Mt. 
Everest" expresses the properties of being an American, 
having climbed Mt. Everest, having climbed a mountain, 
and many others. But this is no doubt due to the fact 
that descriptive phrases are, in a straightforward 
sense, just logical complexes of predicates and express 
logical complexes of the properties represented by 
their constitutent predicates. Since intuitions seem 
to vary about whether proper names also express 
properties, it is somewhat less than clear whether the 
intuitive appeal associated with D's treatment of 
descriptions is carried over to its handling of proper 
names. In fact, one view that Plantinga is 
particularly concerned to dispute is the idea, outlined 
by Mill and defended more recently by Kripke, 
Donnellan, and others,' that proper names have no 
meaning besides their referents and thus do not express 
anything at all. According to this view, proper names 
denote but do not have any "descriptive content" or 
connotation, and certainly do not express properties. 
Clearly this conception directly conflicts with 
Plantinga's, and he attempts to refute it by showing 
that proper names do indeed express properties—in 
other words, by establishing thesis A. 
Given his definition D, Plantinga considers a 
simple case: does "Socrates" express any properties? 
According to D it certainly expresses trivial truistic 
properties, like being human or not human and being 
something or other, though for that matter, all names 
of existents do. Moreover, "Socrates" expresses at 
least one very special property: being identical with 
Socrates, i.e., the essence Socrateity. Consider 
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4) Socrates lias the complement of being 
identical with Socrates. 
(4) expresses a necessarily false proposition if any 
sentence does. "So 'Socrates' exactly expresses the 
property of being identical wltTi Socrates. But of 
course this property is an essence of Socrates. 
"Socrates" expresses the essence of Socrates . . . " (p. 
80). Plantinga's conclusion is that proper names 
express essences as well as properties, that Mill's 
view is false, and that thesis A has been established. 
3. Plantinga's argument for A relies only on Iris 
definition D which, as noted above, accords well with 
our intuitions about the expression of properties by 
definite descriptions. But there is less than 
universal agreement concerning the adequacy of D's 
treatment of proper names, and the question arises 
whether 1) treats singular terms adequately in general. 
This question takes on added importance when it is 
pointed out that D implies A. But then Plantinga's 
argument for A, which explicitly relies on D, is no 
argument at all. To put it less charitably, 
Plantinga's argument begs the question because A 
depends on D. 
It is really rather obvious that D implies A, since 
Ü connects proper names and the properties expressed by 
predicates occurring in necessarily false sentences. 
According to D, every singular term occurring in a 
sentence that expresses a necessarily false proposition 
expresses the complement of the property expressed by 
the predicate of that sentence. On the basis of the 
necessary falsity of a given proposition, D establishes 
a semantic connection between the singular term of that 
sentence and the complement of the property expressed 
by its predicate. When the singular term in question 
is a descriptive phrase, such a connection between it 
and the properties it expresses is perfectly plausible 
since descriptive phrases are, in a sense, nothing but 
logical complexes of predicates. However, as far as 
proper names are concerned, there seems little reason 
to conclude, from their occurrence in necessarily false 
propositions, that they are semantically linked to the 
complements of the properties expressed by the 
predicates of those sentences. But by connecting 
proper names and properties, D creates, ex nihilo, the 
very link in question. Thus it follows from D that if 
any sentence containing a singular term is necessarily 
false, the singular term occurring in it expresses the 
complement of the property expressed by its predicate 
term. And since it is assumed that certain sentences 
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containing proper names express necessarily false 
propositions, it follows that proper names express 
properties. 
To show that D implies A, we need only assume D, 
deny A and derive a contradiction. To deny A we need 
to introduce a species of singular terms—call them 
"markers"—which have the usual properties of proper 
names but do not express properties or essences. One 
characteristic which Plantinga and others attribute to 
proper names is that they rigidly designate their 
referents. A singular term t is a rigid designator 
just in case for every two worlds w and w 1 at which t 
designates at all, its referent in w is identical to 
its referent in w'. Even though the Socrates of @ is 
named "Xenophon" in w and "Louisa May Alcott" in w', 
from our preferrred vantage point at @ we can quite 
well discourse about and refer to this fellow in all 
these worlds by using the name he has in this one. 
So, "Possibly, Socrates is a turnip," does not mean 
that there is some turnip located in modal space which 
is, at that reference point, named "Socrates" but, 
rather, that our very own Socrates is a turnip in some 
other possible world—which is ostensibly false. We 
would do well, then, to suppose that markers are rigid 
designators as well as that they do not express 
properties. 
This situation can be envisaged more vividly, and 
its internal consistency more plausibly motivated, if 
we exploit a common fear of the computer age and 
construct an imaginary situation in which markers 
constructed from numerals play the role of proper 
names. Letting underlined numerals be our markers, we 
may suppose that we assign to a randomly selected 
individual that marker which is constructed from the 
numeral denoting the number of the individual's place 
in the sequence of selections. So if Socrates turns up 
as the 287th person in the selection sequence, "287" 
will henceforth be used in place of "Socrates." Thus 
we might even proscribe the use of proper names 
altogether, perversely imposing on any person caught 
using one the sanction of isolation in a possible world 
whose domain is their own singleton set! Suppose our 
familiar Socrates turns up as the 287th person in the 
random selection process and is accordingly assigned 
the marker "287," would it then be necessarily false 
that 
5) 287 has the complement of humanity? 
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If so, it follows in virtue of D that "207" expresses 
the property of being human in direct conflict with our 
contrary supposition that markers express no properties 
at all. Hence, D implies A if (5) is necessarily 
false. 
And (5) is necessarily false, if Dl and D2 are 
correct in their original form. Since we would 
certainly want to affirm the truth of 
6) The teacher of Plato is essentially 
humani Dl and D2 commit us to the 
truth of 
7) The teacher of Plato is human and 
the necessary falsity of 
0) Socrates has the complement of 
human i. ty. 
This last sentence is necessarily false if and only if, 
for every world w, the w-extension of "Socrates" does 
not belong to the w-extension of "the complement of 
humanity." Both "Socrates" and "287" are, however, 
rigid designators which coincide in at least one world 
(for instance, (<?). Therefore, for every world w, the 
w-extension of "Socrates" is in the w-extension of "the 
complement of humanity" just in case the w-extension of 
"207" is. Thus, the necessary falsity of (5) follows 
from that of (6). 
The obvious conclusion is that D implies A and 
Plantinga's argument for A begs the question. However, 
a more important conclusion may also be drawn from the 
example of markers. The idea of non-expressive 
singular terms seems to be coherent—certainly the 
notion of a marker is consistent—yet D rules out the 
possibility of such singular terms in general. For D 
implies that every singular term occurring in a 
sentence that expresses a necessarily false 
proposition, expresses the complement of the property 
expressed by the predicate term of that sentence. It 
follows from D that if "x has P" is necessarily false, 
"x" expresses the complement of the property expressed 
by "P." To the extent that the idea of non-expressive 
singular terms is coherent—and there is no apparent 
reason why this is not the case—markers provide a 
counterexample to D. Thus since "207," by definition, 
expresses no properties, D implies that 
5) 207 has the complement of humanity 
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could not be necessarily false, though it clearly is. 
So markers constitute a counterexample to D. 
4. Accordingly, D is false and the question of the 
expression of properties by proper names remains open. 
This question is currently much discussed, and quite 
good general considerations have been offered for the 
non-expressive character of proper names. But we need 
not consider these arguments here: for one thing, they 
are simply beyond the scope of our discussion and, for 
another, we can draw some important conclusions 
concerning our present problems independently of a 
solution to this more general difficulty. 
From the foregoing considerations we can conclude 
that the general argument for the circularity of the 
reduction of de re modal sentences to de dicto ones 
does not succeed. Tfie first premise of the argument, 
I, that proper names are indispensable for reducing the 
de re to the de dicto, is false because Dl can be 
amended to eliminate all reference to proper names, 
without impairing the success of the reduction. The 
coincidence of (5) and (8) at every possible world 
suggests the general equivalence of any sentence S with 
the sentence S' constructed from S by the uniform 
replacement of every proper name occurring in S with a 
co-designative marker. That is, if "x" is a proper 
name occurring in the sentence 
S) x has P 
and "a" is a marker such that "x = a" is true in some 
possible world, then 
S' ) a has P 
is equivalent to S in every possible world. This 
equivalence may be exploited by replacing every 
occurrence of "proper name" in Dl with an occurrence of 
"marker." The result of this replacement will define, 
for every object x and property P, a proposition 
equivalent to the kernel proposition with respect to x 
and P. By using this amended formulation of Dl instead 
of the original, all reference to proper names would 
thereby be eliminated from the reduction scheme. 
Consequently, the question of whether or not proper 
names express essences becomes irrelevant; the 
reduction of the de re to the de dicto is accomplished 
without proper names—contrary to I—and Plantinga's 
argument for the circularity of the reduction is short-
circuited. 
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But. if such a change of formulation does not affect 
the success of the reduction scheme, the claim II, that 
proper names express essences, would seem to be 
superfluous for Plantinga's purposes. Substituting 
"marker" for "proper name" in Dl achieves the same 
effect as leaving Dl intact and denying that proper 
names expresses essences, at least as far as the 
question of the success of the reduction of the de re 
to the de dicto is concerned. Since markers are just 
Plantinga 7!; proper names without the "expressive" 
features, if the reduction succeeds when Dl is altered, 
the original Dl would suffice even if proper names 
didn't express essences. Apparently, the question of 
the expression of properties and essences by proper 
names is a pseudo-issue, as far as the success of the 
reduction is concerned. 
Actually, Plantinga connects proper names and 
essences for a quite specific reason; lie seems to 
think, contrary to what has been shown above, that the 
expression of essences by proper names is somehow 
necessary for the success of Dl and D2. Quite simply, 
once proper names are related to essences the latter 
may serve to insure the truth of certain sentences 
containing proper names within the scope of a modal 
operator. In particular, Plantinga relates proper 
names and essences to guarantee the necessary falsity 
of kernel propositions to which true de re claims are 
reduced. Thus since 
9) The Greatest Assyrian heavyweight is 
essentially human 
is true, so must 
10) Necessarily, it is not the case that 
Bubalaba Myshigasha has the 
complement of humanity 
be true, because Dl and D2 would fail if (9) were not 
equivalent to (.10), conjoined with 
11) The greatest Assyrian heavyweight is 
human. 
And (10) is true because the denial of a contradiction 
is necessary. Hence, 
12) Bubalaba Myshigasha has the 
complement of humanity 
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must be a contradiction. Now (12) is considered 
internally inconsistent because "Bubalaba Myshigasha" 
expresses an essence—Bubalaba Myshiqashaeity?—which 
entails humanity and therefore excludes the complement 
of humanity. Plantinga introduces the link between 
proper names and essences to perform just this trick— 
i.e., insuring that the appropriate kernel propositions 
are contradictory and thus necessarily false. No doubt 
he thinks that only contradictions are necessarily 
false and thus he feels compelled to introduce essences 
as meanings, to insure that the appropriate kernel 
propositions turn out necessarily false. 
5. But such a ploy runs against the grain of the 
essentialist's insight. The root intuition from which 
the essentialist doctrine springs is the idea that 
modal or essential properties are possessed by concrete 
individuals. Central to this position is the thesis 
that particular individuals possess properties in such 
a way that had the individual in question lacked them, 
that individual could not have existed. Indeed, 
according to Plantinga, to say that an object has a 
property essentially means "That, presumably, the 
object in question could not conceivably have lacked 
the property in question; that under no possible 
circumstances could that object have failed to possess 
that propery." (p. 11) But his is hardly compatible 
with the link between proper names and essences forged 
by Plantinga. 
The essentialist would, if I understand him 
correctly, insist that it is in virtue of Socrates' 
essence that kernel propositions corresponding to true 
essential predications of him are necessarily false, 
thus denying that these kernel propositions are 
necessarily false in virtue of the meanings of their 
constituent terms. And this leads directly to the 
denial of the claim that proper names express essences. 
The kernel proposition 
13) Socrates has the complement of 
humanity. 
corresponding to the true sentence "Socrates is 
essentially human," is necessarily false because 
Socrates is such that he could not have been other than 
human. For the essentialist, it is not the case that 
the necessary falsity of (13) is due to the fact that 
"Socrates" expresses Socrateity, and so excludes the 
complement of humanity. Rather, (13) is necessarily 
false because of certain features of "Socrates." 
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Indeed, Plantinga's views seem much more closely 
related to the idea that all necessary propositions are 
propositions whose truth follows from the meanings of 
their constituent terms. By relating proper names and 
essences, Plantinga assimilates modal truths containing 
proper names to modal truths ex vi terminorum. But 
then the fundamental insight of essentiaiism is lost: 
modal truths containing proper names are no longer 
explained by reference to how an individual might have 
differed and still existed. Rather, such modal truths 
turn out to be a by-product, as it were, of the 
structure of the language in which they are stated. 
And, as 1 have already over-emphasized, construing 
modal truths containing proper names as truths ex vi 
terminorum conflicts with the basic insight of 
essentiaiism. 
If the expression of essences by proper names 
conflicts with the intuitive basis of essentiaiism, 
then the semantic relation between proper names and 
essences, affirmed by II, should be rejected by the 
essentialist. Moreover, earlier considerations 
established that a theory of essentiaiism which 
maintained Dl and D2 while rejecting II would be 
tenable. In light of the misgivings expressed 
concerning II, it seems appropriate to propose such a 
theory as an alternative to Plantinga's. A theory 
developed along these lines could preserve the 
accomplishments of Plantinga's theory—namely, the 
reduction of the de re to the de dicto—yet it would 
eliminate the feature of Plantinga's views which render 
them inconsonant with the essentialist's intuition. 
Thus, it is plausible to suggest that such a theory 
might capture the intuitive basis of essentiaiism more 
adequately than Plantinga's. 
Indiana University 
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